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I. INTRODUCTION
The email message flowed onto one of the adoption list-servs:
To: Adoption List
From: Adoptive Parent
I just got off the phone with Judge [Smith] in [Jones] County. He is
no longer going to sign any orders recognizing adoptions from
China or allow any re-adoptions from China. He said if he could he
would go back and undo the ones he has previously done. His rea-
soning is he is not educated enough about Chinese Law and the
Adoption Process. He says he will continue researching it. But due
to long term problems, he in good conscious [sic], can no longer
grant relief until he knows for sure that these adoptions are valid
according to U.S. Treaties, U.S. Law, and Texas Law.
t Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. I dedicate this
Article to my daughter, Zoe Elisabeth YiLing, who was adopted from China in 2001.
Special thanks to Eunice Kim, my invaluable research assistant. Thanks also to my
colleague, J. Paul George, who helped me to understand international comity. I also
wish to thank the participants of the International Adoption and Cultural Transfor-
mation Conference held at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law on November 7,
2003, where I presented a version of this paper.
1. Posting of Adoptive Parent (private membership group website), at http://
groups.yahoo.com/group/FCC-NorthTexas/message/2654 (on file with the Author).
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
Do judges have the authority to recognize decrees of foreign adop-
tion? Since 1989, over 167,000 parents of children adopted in other
countries have needed to know the answer to that question.2
Adoption creates a parent-child relationship that is not legally dif-
ferent from a biologically created parent-child relationship.3 Parents
are entitled to the same rights and owe the same obligations to
adopted children as they do to biological children,4 and adopted chil-
dren are entitled to the same benefits as biological children.'
Adopted children are entitled to the financial support of their par-
ents to the same extent as biological children.6 Thus, in the event of a
divorce, parents who adopted their children are responsible for the
payment of child support to the same extent as parents who birthed
their children.7 Adopted children are treated identically to biological
children for purposes of inheritance.8 So, if children inherit under a
2. According to the Department of State, 167,420 immigrant visas have been is-
sued to foreign orphans coming to the United States since 1989. The number of inter-
national adoptions has been steadily increasing since 1989, reaching a high of 20,099
in the year 2001. Immigrant Visas Issued to Orphans Coming to the U.S., U.S. Dep't
of State, at http://travel.state.gov/orphan_numbers.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (on
file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Hurt v. Noble, 817 P.2d 744, 746-47 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991); B.C.S. v.
D.A.E., 818 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied); UNIF. ADOP-
TION ACT § 1-104, 9 U.L.A. 23 (1999); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91
(1998 & Supp. 2003); Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontradi-
tional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 149-50; 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption §§ 178, 180,
183 (1994).
4. See, e.g., 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption §§ 178, 180, 183 (1994).
5. See, e.g., id.
6. See, e.g., id. § 179 ("Generally speaking, upon the adoption of a child, the pri-
mary duty of support of the child is imposed upon the adopting parent. The new
parent's obligation is the same as if he were a natural parent, and the adopted child is
entitled to the same support and maintenance and the same humane treatment to
which he would be entitled if he had been born to the adopting parent in lawful
wedlock.").
7. See, e.g., Sims v. Sims, 62 S.W.2d 495, 495-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1933, writ dism'd).
8. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-91(1) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.114 (Michie 2002);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2114(B) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215(a)(2) (Michie
1987); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6450 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-114(2)
(West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-731 (1958 & Supp. 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 508(1) (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.108(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(a)(2) (1999); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 560:2-614 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109(a) (2001); 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-4 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-8 (West 1999);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.223 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2118(b) (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(2) (Michie 1998); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 214 (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1) (West 1964);
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-207(a) (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210,
§ 7 (West 1998); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.2-114 (West 2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-13 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 474.060 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124(2) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2309 (Michie 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 127.160 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 170-B:20(IV) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(b) (West 2002); N.M. STAT.
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state's intestate succession scheme, then adoptive and biological chil-
dren both inherit. Adopted children are entitled to the same benefits
as biological children under a parent's life or health insurance9 and
under government entitlement programs like Social Security.1 ° In ad-
dition, the Family Medical Leave Act gives the same benefits to par-
ents who add to their families by birth and those who add to their
families by adoption.1
ANN. § 45-2-114(B) (Michie 1978); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(c) (McKinney
1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17(a) (2003); N.D. CENT, CODE § 30.1-04-09 (1996);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(2) (Anderson 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 75 05-6.5 (West Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.175(1) (1993); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2108 (West Supp. 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16 (1956); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-109(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114(b) (1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105(1), § 36-1-126(b) (2001); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40
(Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109(1) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15a, § 1-
105 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(1) (Michie 1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.33.260 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-22-703 (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 854.20(1) (West 2002); Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-107 (Michie 2003).
9. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 395 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Mont. 1975)
(explaining that the word "stepchildren" in group life policy provided for payment to
designated beneficiary and, if no designation was effective, payment to lawful children
of insured, including stepchildren and adopted children, includes child born to in-
sured's first wife prior to her marriage to insured and children adopted by insured's
second wife prior to their marriage, without regard to death of wives); Deveroex v.
Nelson, 517 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1974), affd, 529
S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975) (holding that even though the son of decedent's wife was not
formally adopted by decedent in accordance with provisions of statute, inasmuch as
wife's son was effectively adopted by estoppel, son qualified as a "relative" entitled to
receive proceeds from decedent's life policy, the wife being precluded from receiving
proceeds by reason of having killed decedent); Chancellor v. Chancellor, 23 S.W.2d
761, 763-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1929, writ ref'd) (illustrating that an
adopted child is entitled to proceeds of fraternal insurance policy naming divorced
wife as beneficiary); see Clayton v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order of
Heptasophs, 99 A. 949, 951-52 (Md. 1917) (explaining that where the insured in a
fraternal order had no nearer relatives than children named as beneficiaries, who
were virtually, though not legally, adopted, then the insurance must either go to them
or lapse).
10. The Social Security Act defines "child" to include the "legally adopted child of
an individual." 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2000). A number of courts have approved adop-
tions, reasoning that the child benefits by access to the adoptive parent's Social Secur-
ity benefits. See, e.g., In re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1185-86 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001); In re
Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 840 (1994).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 6382 (a)(1) (1994) reads in part:
Subject to section 6383, an employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 admin-
istrative workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or more of
the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order
to care for such son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for
adoption or foster care.
There is, however, one oddity in the Family Medical Leave Act with regard to adop-
tion. The Act allows an employee to take leave to care for a parent. 5 U.S.C.
§ 6382(a)(1)(C). But parent, as defined in the Act, does not include adoptive parents,
"The term 'parent' means the biological parent of an employee or an individual who
stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a son or daughter." 5
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A legally valid adoption is a necessary precursor to recognition of
the legal benefits just mentioned. With regard to adoptions that occur
in countries outside the United States, under the laws of those foreign
countries, the issue becomes whether those adoptions are valid in cre-
ating the legal parent-child relationship in the United States. Must
state courts recognize the validity of a final decree of adoption from a
foreign country? What would be the ramifications if courts did not
recognize the validity of the foreign adoption? Should adoptive par-
ents return their children to their native lands where often, but not
always, economic and political conditions might threaten their well-
being? Or should adoptive parents raise the children as their own, but
with few or no legal rights for either the parents or the children? 2
Rather than struggle with issues of varying common law rules, dispa-
rate state statutes, international treaties, and traditional versus non-
traditional families, courts should adopt a child-centered approach for
recognition of foreign decrees of adoption, focusing on the best inter-
est of the child.
Part II of this Article will examine the doctrine of international
comity, traditionally thought to give courts the power to recognize for-
eign decrees, as it applies to international adoption. First, the ability
of courts to recognize foreign decrees of "status" generally will be dis-
cussed. Next, the focus will be on courts' authority to recognize the
parent-child status created by foreign adoptions. This subpart will
also review treaties and statutes that touch on the recognition of for-
eign adoption decrees. Part III will consider a traditional limitation
on comity-that courts need not accept judgments that are "repug-
nant" or against the public policy of the state-as it applies to interna-
tional adoption. The Article concludes that courts find "repugnant"
those international adoptions that fail to mimic American notions of a
nuclear family. Finally, Part IV will suggest a child-centered approach
to replace the "repugnance" limitation on international comity.
II. INTERNATIONAL COMITY
A. In General
Legal scholars trace the origins of international comity to the writ-
ings of a 17th century Dutch scholar, Ulrich Huber.13 Writing at a
U.S.C. § 6381(3) (1994). Black's Law Dictionary defines "in loco parentis" as
"[a]cting as a temporary guardian of a child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (7th ed.
1999). While an adoptive parent would qualify as one who "stood in loco parentis," it
is offensive to think that I am not a real parent to my child. I am, instead, someone
who acted in lieu of a parent! So, the Act creates quite a conundrum-my daughter is
my child but I am not her parent!
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.
13. Gary B. Born, Remark, International Comity & U.S. Federal Common Law, 84
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 326, 326 (1991); Harold G. Maier, The Utilitarian Role of a
Restatement of Conflicts in a Common Law System: How Much Judicial Deference is
Due to the Restaters or "Who Are These Guys, Anyway?", 75 IND. L.J. 541, 545 (2000);
384 [Vol. 10
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time of strict notions of territorial sovereignty,14 Huber created the
idea of comity "to explain how a country's laws or judgments could
have force outside [its] own territory."' 5 For Huber, comity was
"courtesy among political entities ... involving mutual recognition of
legislative, executive, and judicial acts."16 Thus, Huber did not believe
that sovereigns were required to apply foreign law, but that they did
so as a matter of international courtesy.'
7
Joseph Story adopted the same approach as Huber in his influential
treatise, Commentaries on the Conflicts of Law.18 For Story, it was out
of comity, or deference to the interests of other states, that the courts
in one nation would give effect to the laws or judgments of another
nation.1 9 Story went one step beyond Huber-rather than viewing
comity as a discretionary courtesy, Story envisioned it as at least a
moral obligation.2"
International comity received approval from the United States Su-
preme Court in Hilton v. Guyot:
21
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-
including not only questions of right between nations; governed by
what has been appropriately called the law of nations, but also ques-
tions arising under what is usually called private international law,
or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within
the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private
or public, done within the dominions of another nation-is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation be-
tween man and man, duly submitted to their determination.22
The Court calls this "the comity of nations., 23 While there is no
absolute right to comity, the Court makes clear that courts ought to
recognize foreign decrees in at least some situations. 24 The Court fur-
ther noted that in deciding whether and what effect should be given to
foreign decrees:
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such ques-
tions is a treaty or a statute of this country. But when, as is the case
Joel Richard Paul, Is Global Governance Safe for Democracy?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 263,
266-67 (2000); Susan L. Stevens, Commanding International Judicial Respect. Reci-
procity and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 26 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 119-20 (2002).
14. See Maier, supra note 13, at 545.
15. Stevens, supra note 13, at 119 (citations omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 119-20.
18. Paul, supra note 13, at 266 (citations omitted).
19. Id.
20. Born, supra note 13, at 327.
21. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
22. Id. at 163.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 163-64.
2004]
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here, there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests
upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the
law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do so, in order to deter-
mine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought before them.2 5
The Court first required that "[e]very foreign judgment, of
whatever nature, in order to be entitled to any effect, must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular
proceedings and due notice."'2 6 The Court further stated that a for-
eign decree must be untainted by fraud.2 7 In assessing whether the
French decree met those requirements, the Court was untroubled by
the fact that the French decree was from a commercial court "whose
judges were merchants, ship captains, stockbrokers and persons en-
gaged in commercial pursuits., 28 Nor was the Court troubled by the
fact that witnesses testified without an oath, that the defendants were
not allowed to cross-examine them, or that hearsay evidence was ad-
mitted. 29 Nor was the Court persuaded that comity was inappropriate
because the defendants only appeared to prevent property in France
from being seized for their failure to appear.30
Although the Court ultimately held that the French decree in that
case was not entitled to comity, it was decided on the ground that
France did not accord United States' decrees comity.3 1 The require-
ment of reciprocity from Hilton v. Guyot is no longer followed,32 but
the doctrine of international comity is alive and well.
33
B. International Comity & "Status"
The Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot also addressed foreign de-
crees affecting status:
A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree con-
firming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every
country, unless contrary to the policy of its own law. It was of a
foreign sentence of divorce, that Lord Chancellor Nottingham, in
the House of Lords, in 1678, in Cottington's Case .... said: "It is
against the law of nations not to give credit to the judgments and
sentences of foreign countries, till they be reversed by the law, and
according to the form, of those countries wherein they were given.
For what right hath one kingdom to reverse the judgment of an-
other? And how can we refuse to let a sentence take place till it be
25. Id. at 163.
26. Id. at 166-67.
27. See id. at 167.
28. See id. at 116.
29. See id. at 204-05.
30. See id. at 204.
31. Id. at 210.
32. Stevens, supra note 13, at 126-27.
33. Born, supra note 13, at 327 ("[Cjomity has not in fact been superceded, it is
alive and if anything far healthier than it ever was.").
[Vol. 10
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reversed? And what confusion would follow in Christendom, if
they should serve us so abroad, and give no credit to our
sentences."
34
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations also notes that foreign
judgments affecting status are recognized in United States courts:
"[A] final judgment of a court of a foreign state . . . establishing or
confirming the status of a person... is conclusive between the parties,
and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United States. ' 3' The
Reporters' Notes make clear that courts in the United States recognize
a great variety of judgments, including judgments of "divorce, cus-
tody, adoption, and other incidents of family status."36
C. International Comity & International Adoption
Recall that the Supreme Court, in Hilton v. Guyot, stated that au-
thority for recognition of foreign decrees could rest on treaties, stat-
utes, or on common law.3 7 All three sources have addressed foreign
decrees of adoption.3"
1. Common Law
The validity of comity of nations, with regard to foreign decrees of
adoption, is sufficiently well recognized to merit inclusion in the legal
encyclopedias.39 Corpus Juris Secondum states:
As a general rule, the status of adoption created under the law of a
state or nation by a court having jurisdiction to create it will be rec-
ognized and given effect in another state, unless the foreign adop-
tion is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the laws or policy of the
other state. Such status will be given the same effect as given in the
forum state to an adoption status created by its own law. Recogni-
tion of a foreign adoption is accorded on principles of comity, or on
the theory that full faith and credit must be given to the foreign
judgment.4 °
Even absent statutory authority, numerous state courts have recog-
nized decrees of adoption issued by foreign nations.41
34. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 148(1) (1987) [herein-
after THIRD RESTATEMENT].
36. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 481 reporters' note 2 (1987). In addi-
tion, §§ 484-486 deal specifically with foreign decrees of divorce, support, and cus-
tody. See id., §§ 484-486.
37. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163.
38. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1-3.
39. See, e.g., 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 195 (1994); 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons
§ 139 (2003).
40. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 139 (2003) (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Corbett v. Stergios, 137 N.W.2d 266, 272 (Iowa 1965) (deciding, prior
to enactment of Iowa statute, to recognize that a Greek adoption was valid for inheri-
tance and did not offend the public policy of Iowa); Stellmah v. Hunterdon Coop. G.
L. F. Serv., Inc., 219 A.2d 616, 624-25 (N.J. 1966) (holding Canadian adoption valid,
2004]
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Most of the foreign adoption cases relying on international comity
involve questions of inheritance.42 For example, in Martinez v. Gutier-
rez,4 3 several children sued for inheritance of Texas realty based on a
Mexican adoption." Quoting from Wharton on Conflicts of Laws, the
court announced the general rule: "There is, however, no doubt as to
the general principle that the status acquired by adoption in a state or
country having jurisdiction will be recognized."4 5 The court recog-
nized the Mexican adoption despite considerable differences in proce-
dure between Texas adoptions and Mexican adoptions.46
2. Statutes
Twenty-seven states have statutes that deal with recognition of for-
eign decrees of adoption.47 A handful of states, while not having stat-
utes that allow for recognition of foreign decrees of adoption, allow
for simplified adoption procedures for foreign-adopted children's re-
adoption.48 Fourteen of those twenty-seven states have statutes that
mirror the common law doctrine of comity.49 A good example is the
New Hampshire statute:
entitling adopted child to workmen's compensation death benefits on death of adop-
tive father); Zanzonico v. Neeld, 111 A.2d 772, 776 (N.J. 1955) (holding an Italian
adoption by a U.S. couple valid under state law for inheritance tax purposes); In re
Estate of Christoff, 192 A.2d 737, 740 (Pa. 1963) (recognizing Greek adoption in
adopted son's claim on estate).
42. See, e.g., Corbett, 137 N.W.2d at 272 (holding Greek adoption valid for inheri-
tance); Stellmah, 219 A.2d at 624-25 (holding Canadian adoption valid, entitling
adopted child to workmen's compensation death benefits on death of adoptive fa-
ther); Zanzonico, 111 A.2d at 776 (holding an Italian adoption by a U.S. couple valid
under state law for inheritance tax purposes); In re Estate of Christoff, 192 A.2d at
740 (recognizing Greek adoption in adopted son's claim on estate).
43. 66 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved).
44. Id. at 679.
45. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §251a (3d ed.
1905).
46. Martinez, 66 S.W.2d at 680.
47. See infra notes 49-53, 69-72 (including Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and
Wisconsin).
48. For example, Illinois modifies the requirement of post-placement investigation
for the adoption of a foreign-born child adopted in its home country. 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 50/6-B (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) ("The requirements of a post-placement
investigation shall be deemed to have been satisfied if a valid final order or judgment
of adoption has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction in a country other
than the United States .... "); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-205 (2003) (stating that
where a child has been previously adopted in a foreign country, "the adoption order
entered in the foreign country may be accepted in lieu of the consent of the biological
parent or parents or the guardian of the child to the readoption").
49. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.160 (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-218 (Michie
2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.192 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-28-1 (West
1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 9 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-1-
101 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 9-312 (West 1964); N.H. REV. STAT.
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A decree of court terminating the relationship of parent and child
or establishing the relation by adoption issued pursuant to due pro-
cess of law by a court of any other jurisdiction within or without the
United States shall be recognized in this state and the rights and
obligations of the parties as to matters within the jurisdiction of this
state shall be determined as though the decree was issued by a court
of this state.
5 °
Nine states have statutes that provide for recognition of foreign adop-
tions so long as the United States Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice has placed its imprimatur on the adoption.51 For example,
Minnesota law provides:
The adoption of a child by a resident of this state under the laws of
a foreign country is valid and binding under the laws of this state if
the validity of the foreign adoption has been verified by the granting
of an IR-3 visa for the child by the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service.52
Ohio has a similar restriction,53 which became crucial in the case of
Walsh v. Walsh.5 4 Mr. Walsh was an American citizen, and Mrs. Walsh
was a citizen of Honduras.55 Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Walsh had a
child, Andres, who was admittedly not the biological child of Mr.
Walsh.56 Three days before the Walshes married, Mr. Walsh com-
pleted a "certification of birth certificate" in Honduras; as a result,
Andres obtained a Honduran birth certificate listing Mr. Walsh as his
father.57 Mr. Walsh admitted at trial that the reason he "register[ed]
himself as Andres's father was to obtain a birth certificate so that a
passport could be issued to bring Andres to the United States ... "58
Andres and Mrs. Walsh came to the United States, and the Walshes
later divorced.59 Mr. Walsh sought to avoid paying child support for
ANN. § 170-B:24 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-39 (Michie 1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-17 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4 (West 1998); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.385 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-106 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,
§ 1-108 (2002).
50. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:24 (2002). Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, New
Mexico, and North Dakota use virtually identical language. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.23.160 (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-218 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.192 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-39 (Michie 1998); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-17 (1997).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-205 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-730 (1958
& Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-8 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 16-1514 (Michie
1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2144 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-313.1
(1999); MINN. STAT. § 259.60 (2002 & Supp. 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.170 (West
2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.18 (Anderson 2003).
52. MINN. STAT. § 259.60.
53. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.18 (Anderson 2003).
54. 764 N.E.2d 1103 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
55. See id. at 1105.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1108.
59. Id. at 1105.
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Andres by denying that he was Andres's father.6" Mrs. Walsh
presented to the court a sworn affidavit from a Honduran attorney,
stating that according to Honduran law, Mr. Walsh had adopted An-
dres.61 The trial court refused to recognize the foreign adoption, how-
ever, because the Ohio statute required a foreign adoption to be
approved by the INS before it could be recognized in Ohio courts.62
Thus, Mr. Walsh was relieved of the responsibility of supporting
Andres.63
The case presents a number of issues. First of all, it seems anoma-
lous to declare that Mr. Walsh is not the father of the child because of
his own failure to secure INS approval. It appears that Mr. Walsh
committed a fraud in acquiring a U.S. passport for the child, which is
why Andres's immigration had no INS approval. To reward him for
the fraud by discharging his child support obligations is odd, indeed.
Second, the court clearly recognized the foreign marriage because it
required the couple to divorce.64 The court was willing to accept the
foreign state's status of marriage, but not the foreign state's status of
parent-child. Third, the requirement of USCIS (formerly the INS) ap-
proval does not exist under most statutes dealing with the recognition
of foreign decrees of adoption.65 If Mrs. Walsh had sought recogni-
tion of the adoption in New Hampshire, for example, it would likely
have been granted. 66 Then, under full faith and credit, Ohio would
have had to recognize the New Hampshire decree that recognized the
Honduran decree.67 So, the happenstance of state residency deter-
mined the acceptability of the foreign decree. Fourth, and perhaps
most importantly, Andres was deprived of parental support because
of the actions of adults over which he had no control. One would be
hard pressed to argue that it was in the best interest of Andres to lose
the parental support of the man who declared himself Andres's father
by having his name placed on Andres's birth certificate.68
60. See id.
61. Id. at 1106.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 1105.
65. See statutes cited supra note 49 and infra note 69.
66. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:24 (2002) (containing no requirement of
INS approval).
67. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Walsh court noted that the Constitution
required full faith and credit be given to judicial acts of other states, noting further
that "[f]ull faith and credit does not operate between Honduras and the United
States." Walsh, 764 N.E.2d at 1110.
68. Professor Gilbert Holmes argues that U.S. family law and constitutional law
ignore the best interest of children by focusing on the rights of parents rather than on
the rights of children. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional
Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L.
REV. 358, 361 (1994) [hereinafter Holmes, The Tie That Binds]:
[The courts] failed to recognize that children have an independent right to
maintain or sever family relationships. The courts ... achieved results ar-
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The remaining states that have statutes addressing foreign decrees
of adoption impose a variety of other requirements before the foreign
decree will be recognized.69 Wisconsin, for example, requires that res-
ident adoptive parents must obtain official approval of the placement
before foreign adoptions will be recognized.70 Delaware grants recog-
nition only if "the child was not brought into this State until after the
finalization of the adoption."71 Texas requires that the foreign adop-
tion not violate fundamental principles of human rights.72
3. Treaties
A treaty to which the United States is a signatory may require rec-
ognition of foreign decrees of adoption. For example, in Corbett v.
Stergios,7 3 the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case because the lower courts failed to consider the effect of a
treaty between Greece and the United States when they refused to
recognize a Greek adoption decree."
The United States has signed,75 though not yet implemented,76 the
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Re-
spect of Intercountry Adoption.7 7 The Hague Convention provides:
guably consistent with the 'best interests of the child' doctrine, but the indi-
vidual decisions, in reality, were inconsistent with that doctrine because each
focused on the adults'-rather than the child's-status and rights in the rela-
tionship. As a result, the courts ... in many respects victimized, rather than
protected, the children by denying them a voice in resolving questions of and
access to relationships with important parent figures.
Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
69. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 927 (1974 & Supp. 2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 162.023 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.97 (West 2003). South
Carolina has the most draconian requirements for recognition-while it does not
speak in terms of adoption, but rather in terms of recognition, that recognition seems
to require most of the steps of an adoption, including a home study "which evaluates
the adjustment and progress of the child and family since adoption." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-1795 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2003).
70. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.97 (West 2003).
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 927 (1974 & Supp. 2002).
72. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.023.
73. 381 U.S. 124 (1965) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 124.
75. The United States signed the Hague Convention on March 31, 1994. Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Full Status Report Convention #33, at http://
www.hcch.net/e/status/stat33e.html#us (last visited Mar. 18, 2004) (on file with the
Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
76. The United States has gone so far as to pass the International Adoption Act of
2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901-14954 (2001), but the State Department is still formulating
regulations for the implementation of the Hague Convention. For the proposed regu-
lations, see Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercountry Adoption Act
of 2000; Accreditation of Agencies; Approval of Persons; Preservation of Convention
Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 54064 (proposed Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt.
96). The last comment period for those proposed regulations ended December 15,
2003.
77. See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th
Session, Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in
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"An adoption certified by the competent authority of the State of the
adoption as having been made in accordance with the Convention
shall be recognized by operation of law in the other Contracting
States."78 This provision in the treaty, which takes precedent over in-
dividual state's laws, will allow for recognition of foreign decrees of
adoption in U.S. state courts.79
The Hague Convention provides, however, that when a contracting
state determines that an "adoption is manifestly contrary to its public
policy, taking into account the best interests of the child," it may re-
fuse to recognize a Convention adoption. 80 The treaty offers no ex-
planation as to when an adoption manifestly contravenes a state's
public policy. It seems, though, that this proviso grants courts the
power to invalidate adoptions similar to the power that the "repug-
nance" exception in international comity gives them.81
Furthermore, the Convention applies only to adoptions between the
sixty-six signatory countries.82 When United States citizens adopt
from non-Hague Convention countries, recognition will not be gov-
erned by the Hague Convention, but by statute 83 or by the common
law doctrine of international comity. 4 This is also the case for the
thousands of families who have been formed through international
adoption, long before the United States implemented the Hague
Convention.
III. WHEN IS INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION "REPUGNANT"?
One limitation placed on international comity in the adoption area
is that:
[T]he local forum need not recognize a status of adoption created
under foreign law contrary to its own public policy, or adhere to or
enforce incidents which, as to adoptive status created by a foreign
jurisdiction are repugnant to the local forum's laws or policy. The
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, 1139 [hereinafter
Hague Conference].
78. Id. at 1142.
79. It is well-established law that federal treaties take precedence over state laws.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
80. Hague Conference, supra note 77, at 1142. One commentator argues that this
proviso grants considerable discretion to states to relitigate the adoption, even al-
lowing inquiry into the child's availability for adoption and the validity of the birth
parents' relinquishment of parental rights. Rosanne L. Romano, Intercountry Adop-
tion: An Overview for the Practitioner, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 545, 581-82 (1994).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 34-46; infra text accompanying notes
82-91.
82. Treaties cannot bind countries that have not signed them. See also Romano,
supra note 80, at 572-73 ("[Tjhe Hague Convention will only obligate those countries
whose governments have individually ratified it.").
83. See supra text accompanying notes 39-52.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
85. The treaty was clearly inapplicable before it came into existence.
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fact that an adoption judgment entered by a court of another state
could not have been entered by a court in the state of the forum,
because in violation of its laws or policy, does not permit the court
of the forum to deny it full faith and credit.
86
But when, precisely, is a foreign adoption repugnant to a state's laws
or policy?
The law makes clear than an adoption is not repugnant merely be-
cause the adoption violates the laws and policy of the state; there has
to be something more.8 7 One court described that "something more"
as follows: "There must be something which offends by shocking
moral standards, or is injurious or pernicious to the public welfare. '88
Justice Cardozo stated:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or
fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.89
Perhaps not surprisingly, courts tend to accept foreign adoptions
that mirror United States' norms of the nuclear family90 and have
found repugnant those that do not.91 This has been the case with U.S.
adoption law in general. As Professor Richard Storrow says, "The law
seeks to shape the adoptive family according to the nuclear family
model": 92
The history of adoption regulation in this country is one of "biolo-
gism," a biologic bias holding "that what is 'natural' in the context
of the biologic family is what is normal and desirable in the context
86. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 139 (2003).
87. In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918), Justice Cardozo
stated, "Similarity of legislation has indeed this importance; its presence shows be-
yond question that the foreign statute does not offend the local policy. But its ab-
sence does not prove the contrary. It is not to be exalted into an indispensable
condition."
88. In re Schultz Estate, 348 P.2d 22, 28 (Or. 1959) (citation omitted).
89. Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202.
90. See Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1996, 2001 n.15 (2003) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (explaining that
"[a]nthropologist George Murdock coined the term 'nuclear family' in 1949 to de-scribe a married man and woman living together with their offspring") (citation omit-
ted). "More pointedly, Murdock observed that in American society, the nuclear
family was 'the type of family recognized to the exclusion of all others."' Id.
91. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
92. Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in
Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 Mo.
L. REV. 527, 606 (2001); see also Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?,
52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1080 (2003) ("Early adoption law confronted the formation of
families without blood ties by relying on the paradigm of the nuclear family .... The
law continues to use the nuclear family paradigm rather than welcome the multiple
configurations of relationships between adults and children."); Nancy E. Dowd, Stig-
matizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 19 (1995) ("The law embodies
pictures of family that focus singularly on the patriarchal marital family.").
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of adoption." As such, the law does its utmost to fashion adoption
in imitation of procreation by, above all, promoting secrecy in the
process. As a result, adoption law has been complicit in valorizing
the nuclear family.
93
This desire to replicate the nuclear family in adoption law has had
implications for "nontraditional" forms of family-single parents
seeking to adopt, and gay men and lesbians seeking to adopt. That
same pattern of nuclear family replication is presented in cases involv-
ing recognition of foreign decrees of adoption.94 While it is safe to say
that courts recognize most foreign decrees of adoption, that is because
most who adopt internationally are two-parent, heterosexual families,
replicating the nuclear family with their adoption.15 For single adopt-
ers, and for gay and lesbian couples seeking to adopt, there is some
question of whether courts will recognize those foreign adoption
decrees.
A. Single Adoption
In Tsilidis v. Pedakis,9 6 the Florida court rejected the Greek adop-
tion of an adult by a single man.97 Demetrius Tsilidis was age 25 and a
Greek citizen when he was adopted in the courts of Greece by Con-
stantine Prassas, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Flor-
ida.98 When Constantine died, Demetrius sought to inherit from his
estate as his son.99 The parties stipulated that the Greek adoption
decree "was procedurally perfected in accordance with all require-
ments of Greek law of adult adoption, and is valid and effectual under
the law of Greece." 1" A Florida statute provided that "an adopted
child, whether adopted under the laws of Florida or of any other state
or country, shall be an heir at law, and for the purpose of inheritance,
shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of his adopting parents." 10 1
As the court noted, at first blush, the statute would allow Demetrius
to inherit from Constantine's estate.0 2
93. Storrow, supra note 92, at 605-06 (citing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY
BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 93
(1999)) (other citations omitted). See also Developments in Law, supra note 90, at
2065-66 ("State prospective parent review processes almost universally prefer tradi-
tional families-heterosexual married couples-over less traditional adoptive parents
(single parents and homosexual parents, for example).").
94. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
95. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
96. 132 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
97. Id. at 13.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 13.
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The court ruled, however, that the Greek decree of adoption was
repugnant to the laws and policy of the state of Florida. °3 Interest-
ingly enough, it was not the fact that Demetrius was an adult that
prevented recognition of the adoption; it was, instead, the fact that
Constantine was single and never married. °4 Florida allowed adult
adoptions: "Any adult married couple, or the survivor thereof, resid-
ing in the state and wishing to adopt another adult, may apply... for
permission to adopt. 10 5 The court concluded:
The very fact that the legislature restricts the right to adopt an adult
to a "married couple, or the survivor thereof" establishes by exclu-
sion the right of a single person to adopt an adult and implies that
such is repugnant to the laws and policy of this state. We need pro-
ceed no further than the clear limitation of the statute in holding
that the appellant is not entitled under the laws of Florida to share
in the estate of Constantine Prassas.
106
Being violative of Florida law should not be enough for "repug-
nance." 10 7 It seems clear that the decree was rejected because the
court did not see a single, never-married man adopting an adult as
fitting the nuclear family model."0 8
Single parenting is no longer an unusual family model. The 2000
U.S. Census revealed that single parents now constitute nearly one-
third of all households with children.10 9 And, there has been consider-
able growth in adoptions by singles, both domestic and interna-
tional.1 0 Nonetheless, there remains a stigma associated with single
parenthood. As one commentator puts it: "A remarkably consistent
view of single-parent families dominates popular culture as well as ac-
ademic writing. 'Single-parent family' is a euphemism ... for 'prob-
lem family,' for some kind of social pathology. Single-parent families
103. Id. at 13.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 10 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 72.34 (West 1987) (renumbered as 63.241
by Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, § 18) (repealed 1973)).
106. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
107. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
108. The Author reaches this conclusion because there are no other apparent rea-
sons for the court's decision. Admittedly, the case was decided in 1961, and perhaps
would be treated differently today. But it is also possible that the subtext of the opin-
ion was the court's concern that an adoption of an adult man by an adult man is an
attempt to give legal status to a homosexual relationship. If that was the true purpose
of the court's ruling, the Florida court might have reached the same conclusion today.
For a discussion of Florida's ban on homosexual adoption, see discussion infra Part
III.B. and text accompanying note 116.
109. Single mothers make up twenty-six percent of families with children; single
fathers make up five percent. See Developments in the Law, supra note 90, at 2001
n.19.
110. See, e.g., Sharon Ann Dougherty, Single Adoptive Mothers and Their Children,
23 Soc. WORK 311, 311 (1978); Kathryn Rose Gertz, Single Parenthood, HARPER'S
BAZAAR, Aug. 1981, at 127, 127; see also MARLENE PIASECKI, WHO ADOPTS CHIL-
DREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS? 69 (1988).
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are characterized as the 'underclass'; broken and deviant as compared
to the nuclear, traditional, patriarchal family."11'
Professor Dowd notes that this stigma is used to justify restrictions
on single persons' access to reproductive technology and to adoption
to create families. 112 Many states and private adoption agencies still
maintain an adoption policy that prefers married adoptive parents
over singles. 1 3 Perhaps the Florida court's Tsilidas decision is justi-
fied by the preference for married, nuclear families over singles.
B. Adoption by Gay and Lesbian Couples
The Author is not aware of any country involved in international
placement of children that openly allows gay and lesbian couples to
adopt. Gay and lesbian couples adopting internationally usually have
one member of the couple adopt the child as a single person." 4 Then,
the other parent seeks a domestic "second-parent" adoption.'1 5 How-
ever, it is conceivable that a foreign country will approve such adop-
tions in the future. Thus, U.S. courts may eventually be faced with
whether to recognize foreign decrees of adoption allowing gay and
lesbian couples to adopt.
Consider the following hypothetical:
Brad Davis enters a committed, long-term relationship with Chris-
topher Martin, and they decide to adopt a child. The country of
Gayswana has recently opened its doors to adoption by gay couples.
Brad and Christopher adopt Maya, carefully following all the laws
111. Cahn, supra note 92, at 1160 ("The condemnation of single-parent families is
based on a view of such families as 'deviant' and 'bad' for children."); Dowd, supra
note 92, at 24-25 (citations omitted).
112. Dowd, supra note 92, at 19.
113. See Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Con-
stitutional Problem?, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487,520 (1991). Although every state
permits single parents to adopt, the National Committee for Adoption has found that
"[m]ost adoption agencies place babies only with married couples." Id. at 518, 520
n.180 (citing NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, 1989 ADOPTION FACTBOOK 162
(1989)); Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at Differing State Court
Opinions, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1497, 1504 (1998) ("Statutes, while they provide for adop-
tions for single parents, generally show a preference for two legal married parents.")
(citing Note, Joint Adoption by Gay and Lesbian Couples: A Proposal for Legislative
Reform, 11 PROB. L.J. 328 (1993)); Note, Joint Adoption: A Queer Option?, 15 VT. L.
REV. 197, 201 (1990) (citing COMM. FOR SINGLE ADOPTIVE PARENTS, THE HAND-
BOOK FOR SINGLE ADOPTIVE PARENTS 1 (Hope Marindin ed., 4th ed. 1987)). But see
Cahn, supra note 92, at 1080 (citing Nancy D. Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between
Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Semen Donors are
Not Fathers, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57, 59 n.6 (2000) (noting that "more states are
allowing single parents and gay and lesbian couples to adopt" and that "[n]o state
restricts the availability of single-parent adoption.... Although certainly some adop-
tion agencies employ such preference, others do not.")).
114. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but Not Parents/Recognizing Par-
ents but Not Partners: Gay & Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 711, 731 (2000).
115. Id.
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and regulations of Gayswana. They then return to the state of Uto-
pia, where they have resided together for five years. After parent-
ing Maya for five years, Brad and Christopher seek to enroll her in
public school. The school questions Maya's Gayswana birth certifi-
cate and looks askance at the foreign adoption decree. So, Brad
and Christopher decide to go to state court in Utopia and seek a
state court decree recognizing the Gayswana adoption decree.
Should Utopia recognize the judicial decree of adoption from Gays-
wana, or is it repugnant to the law and policy of the state? Inciden-
tally, Utopia adoption statutes recite bluntly, "No person eligible to
adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."
' 116
If Utopia were to follow the ruling in Tsilidis,)17 where a state stat-
ute limiting adult adoption to married couples justified invalidating an
adult adoption by a single man in Greece, Maya's adoption from
Gayswana would be repugnant to the laws and policy of the state. In
fact, it would appear to be a stronger argument that the adoption was
repugnant where the statute explicitly prohibited the adoption under
Utopia law. Perhaps the Utopian court would take more seriously the
language of Justice Cardozo: a foreign decree is not repugnant and
will be recognized unless doing so "would violate some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some
deep-rooted tradition of the common wealth." '118
Thus, the action to recognize the foreign adoption decree places the
court of Utopia squarely in the middle of the debate about gay and
lesbian families.119 Is it moral? Is it in the best interest of children?
"Courts today generally use the two-parent, biological family as the
116. Florida law expressly prohibits homosexuals from adopting. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 63.042 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004). Until its statute was amended in 1999, New
Hampshire also had an explicit prohibition against homosexuals adopting. N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (2002) (amended in 1999). A Connecticut statute provides that
a child placement agency need not place a child for adoption with homosexual or
bisexual adoptive parents. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (West 1993 & Supp.
2003). At least four states prohibit adoptions by same-sex couples without mention-
ing homosexuality per se. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-5 (1992 & Supp. 2003); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (West 1993 & Supp. 2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3
(1972 & Supp. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2002).
117. Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); see also discussion
supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
118. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
119. See Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIAT-
RICS IN REV. 339, 339 (2002) (advocating for same-sex adoption); William Saletan,
Adopting Premises: The Sneaky Debate Over Legalizing Adoptions By Gay Couples,
SLATE MAGAZINE, Feb. 7, 2002, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2061789 (on file with the
Texas Wesleyan Law Review); Glenn T. Stanton, Examining the Research Literature
on Outcomes From Same-Sex Parenting, at http://family.org/cforum/pdfs/fosi/mar-
riage/examining-researchon-ss-parenting.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2004) (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) (from the Focus on Family website, arguing
against same-sex adoption); Let Him Stay, at http://www.lethimstay.com (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004) (a website dedicated to ending Florida's ban on gay adoption).
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template against which to measure, and to conform, other families. '1 20
Naturally, the "biological family" model requires one male parent and
one female parent. If the court uses this model, Maya's family doesn't
"fit."
But unlike Tsilidis, which involved the adopted son's right of inheri-
tance from the adoptive father's estate after his death, 2 Maya's fam-
ily is intact. And unlike Tsilidis, Maya is not an adult-she is a 6-year-
old child. Is it in her best interest for the court to refuse recognition
of the foreign decree of adoption? Professor Cahn argues that the
law's use of the nuclear family paradigm fails to take account of the
"settled expectations of those living within [so-called alternative] fam-
ilies." '22 She notes that early adoption law "cabined by the traditional
significance of blood relationships," nonetheless "struggled to accord
respect to functioning parent-child relationships with settled
expectations. '
q 23
Having named the state Utopia, one can hope that the court will
recognize the foreign decree of adoption that created Maya's family.
If it failed to do so, what would the court do with Maya? Should
Maya be removed from the home of the only parents she has known
to be placed with a married, heterosexual couple? Does the family
have to return to Gayswana to be recognized as a family? Will the
court refuse to recognize the decree, but otherwise refrain from inter-
fering with the family?
There may be support for the last option-at least one court has
distinguished between the status of adoption and the incidents of
adoption, refusing to allow inheritance but stating that their refusal
did not depend on the status of the adoption. 24 So, this last option
seems the best of many bad options if a court refuses to recognize a
foreign decree of adoption. But consider all the rights and duties of
parents, discussed previously-all the incidents of adoption. 125 Who
can consent to surgery or other medical treatment for Maya? Who is
responsible for providing financial support? From whom can Maya
inherit, receive Social Security benefits, insurance death benefits?
Who can enroll her in school? Who can be punished for failing to
enroll her in school? Without judicial recognition as parents, neither
Brad nor Christopher can act as Maya's parents. What is clearly
called for is a child-centered approach to judicial recognition of for-
eign decrees of adoption.
120. Cahn, supra note 92, at 1162 (citations omitted).
121. Tsilidis, 132 So. 2d at 10; see also supra text accompanying notes 96-108.
122. Cahn, supra note 92, at 1080.
123. Id. at 1081.
124. See Tsilidis, 132 So. 2d at 13.
125. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 3-11.
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IV. A CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH
Andres does not have a father.126 Demetrius does not have a par-
ent.127 Our fictitious Maya does not have a family. 2 ' Because their
adoptions were "repugnant," courts have concluded that these chil-
dren's adoptions need not be given legal force or effect in the United
States.1 29 In what way is the best interest of these children served by
divesting them of parents? Andres no longer has a father who must
contribute to his support. 130 Demetrius cannot inherit from his fa-
ther's estate. 3' Our hypothetical Maya may have no family at all.
These children are penalized because of legal errors committed acci-
dentally or purposefully by their adoptive parents, or by their adop-
tive parents' ignorance of the laws and policies of the state where they
resided. Wholly innocent, the children suffer.
What is needed, rather than a hyper-technical legality, is a child-
centered approach to recognition of decrees of foreign adoption. One
commentator describes a child-centered approach to adoption policy
as follows:
A child-centered approach to adoption, as well as to other areas of
the law which affect children, incorporates the "best interest of the
child" doctrine and uses the child as the focal point of analysis. A
child-centered approach, however, differs from the traditional "best
interest of the child" doctrine. The best interest doctrine attempts
to meet the needs of the child as perceived by adults. A child-cen-
tered approach attempts to recognize as much of children's reality
as possible and fashion flexible doctrines geared to address that re-
ality. Under a child-centered approach, children's rights emerge
from both the general and specific variations in their needs.'3 2
Professor Holmes also discusses a series of cases-some of which in-
volve adoption-and concludes that courts fail to focus on the rights
of children to maintain family relationships.'33 Instead, they deter-
mine the rights of the parent-or those claiming to be parents-with-
out regard to any right of the child.134
Professor Holmes discusses, for example, the case of Michael H. v.
Gerald D.1 35 Victoria was the biological child of Michael, who was
involved in an adulterous affair with Victoria's mother. 36 Her
126. See Walsh v. Walsh, 764 N.E.2d 1103 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); supra Part II.C.2.
127. See Tsilidis, 132 So. 2d at 13; supra text accompanying notes 69-77.
128. See discussion supra Part III.B.
129. See discussion supra Part III.
130. Walsh, 764 N.E.2d at 1106.
131. Tsilidis, 132 So. 2d at 13.
132. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community: A
Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649, 1670-71 (1995).
133. Holmes, The Tie That Binds, supra note 68, at 370.
134. See id. at 370-72.
135. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
136. Id. at 113.
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mother's husband, Gerald, was recognized as Victoria's father because
of an evidentiary presumption of legitimacy of children born during a
marriage.137 The United States Supreme Court rejected Michael's at-
tempt to maintain a relationship with Victoria, his child, because his
claim did not seek to protect a relationship "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition., 138 After all, Michael was an adulterous
father.
139
Professor Holmes argues that courts subordinate the child's rights
to the adult's rights, reducing "the child to an object instead of treat-
ing the child as a person. ' 140 He concludes:
The real tragedy of these cases, however, is that the rationale used
for denying the claim of the 'nonlegal' parent ... usually is irrele-
vant to a child's interest in protecting important family relation-
ships. A child takes no part in creating the 'legal' barriers that
prevent a parent-like adult from maintaining the relationship. Vic-
toria did not commit the adultery that ultimately precluded her rela-
tionship with her biological father.
1 41
While repugnance might be a valid limitation on international com-
ity when the issue involves collection of a money judgment obtained
abroad, 42 it does not serve the interest of children in international
adoption. Because an adoption decree affects a child in a way com-
pletely outside the control of the child, courts should be protective of
maintaining the parent-child relationship created by the decree of
adoption. International comity is, at bottom, a doctrine of defer-
ence-one country's deference to the legal judgments of another
country. 143 In family-creation, that deference should be greater in
light of the consequence of a lack of deference-family destruction.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States does not hold a monopoly on defining family.
When American citizens form families by adopting children from for-
eign countries in accordance with the laws of those countries and then
return to the United States, they are essentially importing that foreign
country's definition of family. Current United States law concerning
137. Id. at 115.
138. Id. at 124.
139. See id. at 120, 127 n.6, 130. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the plurality
opinion refers to Michael H. "no fewer than six times" as the "adulterous natural
father." Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Holmes, The Tie That Binds, supra note 68, at 381.
141. Id. at 382-83 (citations omitted).
142. As was the issue in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), discussed supra Part
II.B.
143. See Stevens, supra note 13, at 120 (quoting legal scholar Friedrich Juenger,
who described comity as "deference to foreign law," and further quoting him as say-
ing, "It is presumptuous for the courts of one country to review the judgments of
another.") (citations omitted).
400 [Vol. 10
WHEN IS ADOPTION "REPUGNANT"?
recognition of those foreign decrees of adoption, however, appears to
discount definitions of family that do not mirror American norms.
The law leaves children and families at the mercy of varying common
law rules, disparate state statutes, uncertain international treaties, and
differing judgments of when a foreign adoption is repugnant to public
policy. This uncertainty can be corrosive to the parent-child relation-
ship, with neither parents nor children clear on what the legal status of
their family might be in the jurisdiction in which they live. Thus,
traditional notions of international comity, with its amorphous repug-
nance exception, seem particularly unsuited to determining family sta-
tus where permanence is paramount. Courts should, instead, adopt a
child-centered approach focusing on what is best for families.
Professor Cahn provides persuasive support for the fact that non-
traditional families can help us expand the meaning of family without
destabilizing families."' She argues that comparing nontraditional
families to the nuclear family is inherently problematic:
If the law defines families as two parents (one man and one woman)
with their child(ren), then legal actors will try to change the new
families to fit into this image. If families are defined as intimate
arrangements for the protection of adult intimacy and/or nurturing
of children, then there is an obvious need for protecting and pro-
moting such arrangements.1
45
International adoption, in connecting us to the wider world, holds the
promise for an expanded definition of family, but if U.S. courts refuse
to recognize these families created under foreign law, we are left with
our narrow, parochial view. A new standard for recognition of foreign
decrees of adoption would require courts to recognize those decrees,
giving due deference to judgments of foreign courts in creating these
families, and protecting and promoting functioning families with set-
tled expectations.
144. See Cahn, supra note 92, at 1080-82.
145. Id. at 1087.
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